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 Turkey and the west
 The rise of Turkey-centric westernism
 This article argues that Turkey's approach towards its western partners,
 meaning the United States and the European Union, has recently evolved
 into Turkey-centric westernism. Contrary to the argument that Turkey has
 begun to turn its face away from the west under the Justice and Development
 party (AKP) governments since 2002, this article contends that what has
 changed in Turkey's approach towards the west is not Turkey's commitment
 to successfully complete its western-friendly transformation process at home
 and abroad, but the decades-old fixation with the idea that membership in
 western institutions, most notably the European Union, is a must for this to
 happen. Turkey is also less concerned that its western and European identity
 be recognized by western/European countries themselves.
 Turkey-centric westernism questions the idea that Turkey is a mere
 tool for the materialization of western security interests in other locations.
 Rather, Turkey is an actor on its own. A more interest-based, rather than
 identity-related, approach is in place, but, in addition, Ankara is now
 more self-confidant than ever in its dealing with western actors. The most
 Tank Oguzlu is a faculty member in the department of international relations at Búként
 University, Ankara, where he focuses on Turkish foreign policy, Turkey's relations with the
 European Union, international relations theory, and foreign policy analysis.
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 notable manifestation of this Turkey-centric westernism is that Turkey has
 increasingly adopted a more self-centric approach in its foreign policy,
 while simultaneously undertaking a western/European transformation at
 home and working towards the creation of a new regional environment
 in its neighbourhood, particularly the Middle East, in conformity with
 the constitutive principles and norms of western/European international
 society. Turkey has now become a country that very much upholds western/
 European values and employs western/European tools and style in its
 foreign policy, yet increasingly justifies such practices in the context of its
 national interests.
 This article argues that such an outcome in its foreign policy is mainly
 a product of Turkey's successful economic performance and political
 democratization, as well as the so-called strategic-depth foreign policy
 doctrine of the governing party. A related argument is that the changing
 dynamics of international-systemic and regional politics in the post 9/11
 era have provided the impetus for such a turn in Turkish foreign policy.
 Put another way, exogenous factors occurring at international and regional
 levels have simply provided the context in which Turkey's bargaining power
 vis-à-vis western actors has increased and Turkey has been able to adopt
 a more nationalistic and self-centric foreign and security policy outlook.
 Turkish decision-makers have increasingly noted the negative consequences
 of some western—read American—policies in the Middle East on Turkey's
 national interests, and have gradually arrived at the conclusion that adopting
 a long-term transformative foreign policy in this region, similar to EU's
 neighbourhood policies, would best serve Turkey's interests.
 The article proceeds, first, with a description of Turkey-centric
 westernism, including its constitutive principles and an empirical
 demonstration of this approach. Then it analyzes the causes of the approach,
 and the conclusion recaps the main findings of the research and offers some
 predictions for the future.
 TURKEY-CENTRIC WESTERNISM
 Principles
 Observers in recent years have increasingly noticed that Turkey has begun to
 adopt a new approach towards the west, namely Turkey-centric westernism.
 In this view, Turkey does not dispute the constitutive norms of the western
 centric international environment, yet it tries to help fix the existing system
 in such a way as to much better reflect its concerns and priorities at home
 and abroad. The goal is neither to come up with a particular Turkish model,
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 mainly in opposition to the west, that might pave the way for Turkey's
 hegemonic ambitions in the so-called greater Middle Eastern region, nor to
 achieve a westernized Turkey that puts on western glasses wherever possible.
 At the core of Turkey-centric westernism lies the idea that coping with the
 challenges of the ongoing globalization process requires Turkey to continue
 its liberal democratic transformation process at home and help develop a
 friendly strategic environment in its region. Turkey balances its relations
 with key western actors by strengthening its relations with non-western
 actors whenever this is considered to be in Turkey's national interests.
 Rather than automatically following a western route, the continuation of the
 westernization/Europeanization process has become increasingly hinged
 on the degree to which this enables Turkey to solve its structural problems at
 home and contributes to its rise externally.1
 In this view, the westernization process has thus far gained root in
 Turkey and it would be illogical and impractical to reverse this tide. In the
 vocabulary of historical sociology, one could talk about the existence of a
 path dependency in Turkey's relations with the west.2 Dating back to the
 late Ottoman era, the westernization process has now fully become one of
 the constitutive characters of Turkey's nation-state identity.3 Each particular
 stage of this process appears to have been built on the gains of the previous
 ones. Despite all the troubles and conjectural obstacles along the way, the
 process has continued and Turkey has grown closer to the west than ever.
 Turkey's efforts to join the EU, on the one hand, and investment in
 the strategic relationship with the United States and NATO, on the other,
 continue. However, in contrast to the past, Turkey now wants to make sure
 that it sits in the driver's seat. While the pace of EU-related reforms at home
 has been increasingly subjected to the degree of Turkey's digestion and
 absorption capacity, strategic cooperation with western actors appears to
 hinge on the existence of common interests.4
 ι Ahmet Davutoglu, "Turkey's zero problems foreign policy," Foreign Policy, 20 May
 2010, www.foreignpolicy.com.
 2 Isa Camyar and Halil Mustafa Tagma, "Why does Turkey seek European Union
 membership? A historical institutional approach," Turkish Studies n, no. 3 (September
 2010): 371-86.
 3 Kivanc Ulusoy, "The changing challenge of Europeanization to politics and
 governance in Turkey," International Political Science Review 30, no. 4 (2009): 363-84.
 4 Ahmet Davutoglu, "Turkey's foreign policy vision: An assessment of 2007," Insight
 Turkey 10, no. 1 (2008): 77-96.
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 Turkish decision-makers have gradually embraced a Turkey-centric
 world view whereby contributing to the transformation of the so-called
 weak and failed states in Turkey's environment in the image of western
 liberal-plural-democratic norms is now seen to be vital for Turkey's security
 interests. Similar to the foreign policy practices of the European Union,
 Turkey has begun to pursue a transformative foreign policy in its region
 whose fundamental premises are to contribute to regional integration and
 interdependence.5
 While continuing to develop strategic and cooperative relations with
 non-western countries, Turkey takes the utmost care to make sure that
 such relations are not inimical to western interests. Similar to China's
 "peaceful rise/peaceful development" strategy, Turkey tries to contribute to
 the emergence of a friendly regional environment through the adoption of
 soft-power tools. However, unlike China, Turkey is not waiting for the day
 it feels confident enough to help institutionalize a non-western political and
 economic order. Adopting free-market economy and liberal democracy on
 the one hand and fostering interdependent relations with the key western
 actors on the other are considered to be vital for the success of Turkey's
 developmental strategy.
 It is without any doubt that the coming to power of the AKP has played
 a decisive role in the strengthening of this approach. The strategic-depth
 doctrine of the governing party envisages an independent foreign policy
 agency on the part of Turkey and puts its relations with the west on a more
 equal footing while simultaneously prioritizing the emergence of a Turkey
 friendly regional environment in the image of western norms.
 According to this doctrine, Turkey has the responsibility to help put
 its region in order. This is the mission Turkey inherited from the Ottoman
 empire. Though the fulfilment of this mission would likely serve Turkey's
 realpolitik security concerns, the idea that Turkey needs to fulfil a particular
 historical mission is very much idea-politik. "Zero problems with the
 neighbours" might appear to be a realpolitik calculation of how to achieve
 regional stability, yet it is also the ideational and visionary foreign policy
 strategy that Turkey should pursue in order to help resurrect the pax
 Ottomanica.6
 5 Kemal Kirisci, "The transformation of Turkish foreign policy: The rise of the trading
 state," New Perspectives on Turkey 40 (2009): 29-57.
 6 Bulent Aras and Aylin Gorener, "National role conceptions and foreign policy
 orientations: The ideational basis of the Justice and Development party's foreign
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 The historical mission that Turkey inherited from the Ottoman empire
 cannot be implemented by pursuing a one-dimensional, in this case pro
 western, reactive, and passive foreign policy. Strategic-depth doctrine
 foresees an independent/visionary/order-creating role for Turkey. In the
 words of Davutoglu, Turkey should be seen as an actor rather than an issue.7
 Turkey should be concerned with what happens in the former territories
 of the Ottoman empire and get involved in disputes between the former
 subjects of the empire.
 Turkey should not define its role as helping fulfil the strategic interests
 of extra-regional powers. Adopting a Turkey-centric foreign policy with
 multi-directionalism and multi-dimensionalism as its main characteristics
 is the only way for Turkey to act true to its history and to become a "normal"
 country.8 Turkey is rich in terms of its culture and links to other people,
 society, religion, geographical location, and religion. Making use of them
 through diplomatic, multinational, and regional mechanisms and tools is
 what is needed to fulfil this historical mission.
 According to the strategic-depth doctrine, the EU should represent
 the successful merger of different civilizations and cultures in a secular
 fashion so as to become an example of unity in diversity.9 Turkey's mission
 should be to help transform the EU from inside. Interestingly, the AKP
 leadership disputes Turkey's traditional modernization process and argues
 that Turkey's potential membership in the EU should not suggest Turkey's
 assimilation to the European civilization or modernization project. Islam
 and Turkey's Ottoman legacy are as important and influential as Turkey's
 westernization process in terms of defining its national identity and foreign
 policy orientation. Turkey neither is in an overt rivalry with western actors nor
 should invest too much capital in the recognition of its western/European
 identity by the west. Rather, Turkey's links to the west would be beneficial
 for the materialization of its interests in the east. Similarly, the strategic
 depth doctrine sees Turkey's eastern connections as leverage in its dealings
 policy activism in the Middle East," Journal of Balkan and Near East Studies 12, no. ι
 (2010): 73-92.
 7 "A special report on Turkey: The Davutoglu effect," Economist, 21 October 2010,
 www.economist.com.
 8 Alexander Murinson, "The strategic depth doctrine ofTurkish foreign policy," Middle
 Eastern Studies 42, no. 6 (November 2006): 945-64.
 9 Hasan Kosebalaban, "The permanent 'other'? Turkey and the question of European
 identity," Mediterranean Quarterly 18, no. 4 (2007): 87-111.
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 with the west.10 Turkey's active participation in the "alliance of civilizations"
 initiative of the United Nations can be interpreted through this prism.11
 The stress on agency is very much affected by the increases in Turkey's
 economic and military power capabilities compared to its western partners
 and neighbours. Turkey is now the iyth-largest economy in the world and its
 national economy has been growing by six to eight percent annually over the
 last decade. Turkey is a member of the G20, an international platform that
 brings together the most developed 20 economies all over the word. Turkey
 also has the second-largest army within NATO and spends on average
 four percent of its national wealth on military expenditures, a ratio much
 above the NATO average. The Turkish army also has sophisticated military
 capabilities, such as the ability to refuel in the air and to deploy a substantial
 number of soldiers into war zones in short notice.
 Turkey-centric westernism also reflects the growing consensus among
 Turkish business elites that continued economic development increasingly
 requires that Turkey have access to various markets for its manufactured
 goods as well as attract global investors to set up business ventures in
 Turkey.12 The rise of an Anatolian bourgeoisie is noteworthy in this context,
 for these circles are not only behind the rise of the AKP in Turkish politics
 but are also ardent supporters of Turkey's continuing efforts to enlarge its
 economic horizons beyond the west.1' To these prospering economic elites
 an economy-based multidirectional/multidimensional foreign policy is the
 only game in town. They are also cognizant of the fact that nearly half of
 Turkey's trade is with the west, and mainly the EU, and that Turkey owes
 its economic success to the strengthening and implementation of the free
 market oriented liberal economic philosophy.
 Demonstration
 What are examples of Turkey acting on the premises of Turkey-centric
 westernism? The answer to this question can be found for both internally and
 10 Ahmet Sozen, "Paradigm shift in Turkish foreign policy: Transition and challenges,"
 Turkish Studies n, no.i (March 2010): 103-23.
 11 Ali Baici and Nebi Mis, "Turkey's role in the alliance of civilization: A new perspective
 in Turkish foreign policy," Turkish Studies 9, no. 3 (2008): 387-406.
 12 Ziya Onis, "Beyond the 2001 financial crisis: The political economy of the new
 phase of neo-liberal restructuring in Turkey," Review of International Political Economy
 16, no. 3 (2009).
 13 Mustafa Sen, "Transformation of Turkish Islamism and the rise of the Justice and
 Development party," Turkish Studies n, no. ι (March 2010): 59-84.
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 externally. Despite the fact that Euro-skepticism and anti-Americanism have
 recently increased in Turkey, the country's liberal democratic transformation
 alongside the EU accession process has continued unabated. This process
 makes itself particularly apparent with regard to solve the structural Kurdish
 problem. The argument that this problem can only be solved by increasing
 the quality of pluralist democracy at home has had greater resonance.'4 That
 the AKP government initiated the so-called democratic (Kurdish) opening in
 late 2009 is a prime example of Turkey's determination to find a solution
 to the issue by strengthening liberal democracy.15 The reforms made in
 the constitution and other realms, particularly in the area of civil-military
 relations, testify to the growing degree of westernization and Europeanization.
 In addition, the practice of renaming potential security issues as "political
 issues" has gained strength, as the process of desecuritization has gradually
 taken root in parallel to the Europeanization process.
 Turkey's foreign policy has in recent years become more Europeanized
 and westernized than ever despite the counter argument that Turkey has
 gradually grown away from the west. On close inspection, it becomes clear
 that in terms of style, process, and outcome, Turkish foreign policy has lately
 become more European than ever.
 In terms of style, Turkey has begun to speak softly; to prioritize economic,
 diplomatic, and soft-power tools over military and hard-power ones; to use
 regional and multinational settings to air its views; to contribute to the
 settlement of regional disputes by helping to create regional consciousnesses
 and interdependencies; to play facilitative roles in the solution of regional
 problems through active third-party roles; to mediate between western actors
 and Iran; and to urge the countries in the greater Middle Eastern region to
 accelerate their liberalization and democratization processes.16 The messages
 Turkish leaders have begun to give to their counterparts in the Middle East
 14 Alper Kaliber and Nathalie Tocci, "Civil society and the transformation of Turkey's
 Kurdish question," Security Dialogue 41, no. 2 (2010): 191-215; Laman Tasch, "The EU
 enlargement policy and national majority-minority dynamics in potential European
 Union members: The example of Turkey," Mediterranean Quarterly 21, no. 2 (spring
 2010): 18-46.
 15 Cuma Cicek, "Elimination or integration of pro-Kurdish politics: Limits of the AKP's
 democratic initiative," Turkish Studies 12, no. 1 (2011): 15-26.
 16 Meliha Altunifik and Esra Çuhadar, "Turkey's search for a third-party role in Arab
 Israeli conflicts: Neutral facilitator a principled power mediator," Mediterranean Politics
 15, no. 3 (2010): 371-92; Kemal Kirisci, "Turkey's foreign policy in turbulent times,"
 Chaillot Paper 92, European Union Institute for Security Studies, September 2006.
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 are western-friendly. Turkey's adoption of a transformative foreign policy in
 its neighbourhood, aiming at institutionalizing interstate relations within
 regional platforms and increasing interdependent economic, social, and
 political interactions is very much European in essence. Signing free-trade
 agreements with neighbours, fostering transnational linkages, and investing
 in public diplomacy are particular examples that suggest that Turkish foreign
 policy has already become Europeanized and desecuritized.17
 Turkey's reactions to the so-called Arab spring also reveal that Turkey
 centric westernism was already underway. Though it is still too early to chart
 a true description of Turkey's response to the ongoing uprisings across the
 Middle East, it would be appropriate to underline that Turkey has eventually
 sided with the demonstrators in many countries and increasingly urged
 incumbent regimes to meet people's demands in a satisfactory manner.
 Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, Turkey's support to the demonstrators in Libya
 and Syria came belatedly, yet the messages of Turkish leaders have remained
 the same throughout: rulers should be accountable to the public; legitimacy
 and sovereignty should germinate from elections and rulers' capability to
 meet public demands; a liberal-democratic transformation is needed to
 integrate the whole area into the global political-economic system; when
 rulers fail to provide their people with security and prosperity, it is legitimate
 for the international community to take on the responsibility to protect those
 who continue to suffer.18
 Such messages are very much western and European in essence and
 simultaneously reflect Turkish thinking that Turkey should from now on
 prioritize human rights in neighbouring countries and actively contribute
 to the democratization of the Middle East. It is noteworthy in this context
 that this European stance on the Arab spring has been directly informed
 by Turkey's internal transformation along the same principles, as well
 as Turkey's increasing power capabilities and security needs. Turkey's
 responses to the Arab spring, as it has unfolded to date, reveal that Turkish
 foreign policy has begun to operate with a successful combination of ideal/
 moral-politik and realpolitik factors. Turkey has been asking its neighbours
 to the south to transform into democracies, which denotes the growing
 17 Bulent Aras and Rabiya Karakaya Polat, "From conflict to cooperation:
 Desecuritization of Turkey's relations with Syria and Iran," Security Dialogue 39, no.
 5 (2008): 495-515.
 18 "Turkey will not stand by the wrongdoing in Syria," Today's Zaman, 19 June 2011,
 www.todayszaman.com.
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 impact of Turkey's internal transformation—and specifically, its identity—
 on its foreign policy. At the same time, this stance reflects the realpolitik
 calculation that Turkey's national security interests would be much better
 served were the region to transform in the image of the norms that have
 long been shaping Turkey's internal transformation. It will be increasingly
 difficult for Turkey to justify its cooperation with countries whose regimes
 violate the fundamental rights of their people and fail the democracy test.
 In terms of process, elected civilians are now more active and influential
 than appointed bureaucrats, particularly in the military, in making decisions,
 and in defining the ends and means of Turkey's national interests. The most
 appropriate examples to mention in this context include Turkey's changing
 policies on the Cyprus dispute and the Kurds of northern Iraq.19 That Turkey
 is now trying to achieve peace with its past, identity, and neighbours also
 testifies to the strengthening of civilianization in the decision-making
 process.
 And finally, as far as outcome is concerned, Turkey's foreign policy
 choices and actions in its neighbourhood are increasingly convergent
 with the policies of western actors. The recent disagreements between
 Turkey and the United States on Israel and Iran do not negate this fact.20
 Turkey supports the transformation of its neighbourhood in the image of
 western norms; encourages membership of these countries in international
 organizations; supports strategic cooperation with Russia and its long-term
 liberal transformation; and sees the solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute as
 vital for regional stability as well as to defeat radical religious terrorism.
 Turkey's relations with the United States either bilaterally or within
 NATO also reveal a similar picture. Despite the fact that these two countries
 have in the recent past disagreed on such issues as regime change in Iraq,
 19 Ayse Aslihan Celenk, "The restructuring of Turkey's policy towards Cyprus:
 The Justice and Development party's struggle for power," Turkish Studies 8, no. 3
 (September 2007): 349-63.
 20 At first glance, Turkey's embrace of Hamas and strong criticism of Israel in recent
 years might suggest that it stands in opposition to the United States. However, on
 closer inspection it becomes clear that Turkey is not alone in this context and that
 almost all countries on earth, including the US, have intensified their criticism of
 Israel's policies, particularly in the aftermath of operation Cast Lead in late 2008; that
 the US and other western countries have begun to change their attitudes towards
 Hamas in such a way as to help incorporate it into the negotiation process; and
 that Turkey and Israel have now increased their efforts to mend fences following the
 infamous flotilla crisis in May 2010.
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 the future of Iraqi Kurds, the presence of PKK terrorists in northern Iraq,
 the rise of Iran's regional influence, the incorporation of Syria and Hamas
 into the international community, the future of the Arab-Israeli dispute, the
 enlargement of NATO to Ukraine and Georgia, the NATOization of the Black
 Sea region, the NATO mission in Afghanistan, and the institutionalization
 of missile-defence shield mechanisms within NATO, it would be wrong to
 argue that Turkey has increasingly adopted anti-American positions and
 tried to make it unlikely for the US to achieve its goals.21 Rather, on close
 inspection one observes that Turkey has been paying the utmost care not
 to damage US interests and the two countries could eventually succeed in
 finding consensus on many issues.
 More importantly, Turkey still views NATO as an important guarantee
 of its security and avoids any attempt to acquire nuclear weapons.22 Even
 with regard to Iran's alleged nuclear weapons program, Turkey has played a
 facilitator role between Tehran and western capitals and has tried to convince
 the Iranian regime in move in line with the strategic priorities of the west.23
 Turkey's coming closer to the United States has recently been accelerated by
 the decision of the Obama administration to draw down the number of US
 troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as Turkey's acquiescence in the idea
 that NATO would do well to develop a ballistic missile defence capability
 in the context of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Besides,
 membership in the transatlantic alliance still remains one of Turkey's
 strategic priorities. Despite the fact that the latest transatlantic survey of the
 German Marshall Fund finds the degree of anti-westernism increasing in
 Turkey, it has continued to participate in NATO's out-of-area missions and
 to support the transformation of the alliance in functional and geographical
 terms.24 What appears to have changed, however, in the context of Turkish
 American relations is Turkey's automatic alliance-driven following of US
 21 Cilles Andreani, "Turkey, Europe and the United States in a multipolar world,"
 German Marshall fund of the United States, Mediterranean policy program, 11 June
 2010.
 22 Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Reassessing the role of US nuclear weapons in Turkey," Arms
 Control Today, June 2010, 8-13.
 23 Mark Fitzpatrick, "Iran: The fragile promise of the fuel-swap plan," Survival 52, no.
 3 (June-July 2010): 67-94.
 24 "Transatalantic trends survey," German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2010,
 www.gmfus.org.
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 leadership. Rather, Ankara's cooperation with Washington has increasingly
 hinged on the extent to which it contributes to Turkey's national security
 interests.
 Similarly, Turkey's growing relations with such rising powers as Brazil,
 Russia, India, and China, and openings to Africa and South America, do not
 denote Turkey's intentions to form anti-western coalitions, but rather reflect
 its desire to take advantage of emerging global realties in political, military,
 and economic realms. Turkey is not the only country preparing itself for
 an emerging post-western world. Western countries have also engaged in
 similar policies.25
 The growing salience of Turkey-centrism can also be detected in the
 Turkish perception that the European Union has turned into a myopic
 strategic actor in the post-Cold War era that focuses mainly on internal EU
 developments. To Turkish elites, investing in the membership of the central
 and eastern European countries and strengthening of good governance
 in Europe's peripheries do not make the EU a strategic actor with a global
 mindset. In the eyes of Turkish elites, the EU is certainly an economic giant,
 yet it is still a dwarf in politics and a pigmy in defence. Diverging security
 rationales among members and the growing renationalization of foreign
 policy outlooks in key member states militate against the EU's ability to
 become a credible strategic actor that defines its core security interests and
 the means to achieve them collectively and convincingly.26 To what extent
 the Lisbon treaty of December 2007 can help the members overcome such
 challenges remains an open-ended question. The latest economic crisis also
 militates against the EU's international leadership. In the view of the Turkish
 elites, so long as the European Union continues to suffer from economic
 crises, aging populations, and decreasing defence spending, it will not be
 able to transform into a credible global actor. Such an EU would not be able
 to assess Turkey's potential contributions to European security or appreciate
 Turkey's potential power. This in turn curtails Turkey's willingness to define
 its future inside the EU.
 Turkey's critical stance on the EU has also been informed by the fact
 that the idea of multiculturalism has become increasingly disputed by such
 25 Adam Quinn, "The art of declining politely: Obama's prudent presidency and the
 waning of American power," International Affairs 87, no. 4 (2011): 803-24.
 26 Charles A. Kupchan, "The potential twilight of the European Union," Council on
 Foreign Relations international institutions and global governance program working
 paper, September 2010.
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 mainstream European politicians as Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy, and
 David Cameron in the post-9I11 era.27 As long as Europeans fear the prospect
 of Europe being transformed into Eurabia, Islamophobic sentiments will
 run high and immigration from Muslim lands will be seen as a security
 issue. Similarly, unless Muslims in Europe feel that they belong and are
 included as European Muslims, the EU's appeal to the Islamic community
 will diminish and this will negatively affect Turkey's perception of the EU as
 a powerhouse and magnet.
 One of the demonstrative examples of the Turkey-centric approach
 towards the EU is that Turkey has gradually begun to put more emphasis
 on developing strategic cooperation with key EU members, rather than
 treating the EU as an independent international actor on its own. With
 the exception of the United Kingdom, which has long been a supporter of
 Turkey's membership, Turkey has signed strategic bilateral agreements with
 France and Germany. Interestingly, these two countries oppose Turkey's full
 membership the most yet both recommend that the EU establish a privileged
 partnership with Ankara. Turkey's efforts to improve relations with Greece
 on a strategic and bilateral level constitute another example in this vein.
 Although growing opposition to Turkey's eventual accession to the
 union has contributed to the Turkey-centric perspective, this study does not
 argue that Turkey's growing engagement with the Middle East in recent
 years has been caused primarily by the EU's rejection of it.28 However, as
 Europeans question the suitability of Turkey's accession to the EU, many
 Turks view the Middle East as an alternative strategic destination. The idea
 is that rather than Turkey's perpetually knocking on the EU's door, it should
 aspire to become the leading country of the greater Middle Eastern region.29
 Turkey no longer indexes its policies solely to the wishes of its western
 partners, as it has increasingly become clear that Turkey's concerns over
 its territorial integrity have increased due to particular US policies in the
 Middle East. For example, Turkey is not happy with the growing prospects
 of Kurdish independence, or Iran's ability to punch above its weight in
 the post-Saddam Middle East, or the continuation of the deadlock over the
 27 George Friedman, "Germany and the failure of multiculturalismi," 2010, www.
 realclearworld.com.
 28 Jürgen Gerhards and Silke Hans, "Why not Turkey? Attitudes towards Turkish
 membership in the EU among citizens in 27 European countries, "Journal of Common
 Market Studies 49, no. 4 (2011): 741-66.
 29 Ziya Onis, "The new wave of foreign policy activism in Turkey: Drifting away from
 Europeanization?" Danish Institute for International Studies report 5, January 2009.
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 Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Rather than following the western leadership
 automatically, an increasing number of Turks has begun to believe that
 policies of Turkey's western partners, wherever they are implemented, may
 not automatically serve Turkey's security interests.30 They believe that Turkey
 should play a more assertive role in its region because others' actions and
 policies in the Middle East now closely affect Turkey's internal developments
 and national security.
 ENABLING FACTORS
 Changes at the systemic and regional levels have been important insofar as
 they have provided the context for Turkey-centric westernism, strengthened
 Turkey's ability to maneuver in its own region, and raised questions over the
 merits of following a solely pro-western foreign policy.
 The first point to mention in this context is that the changes in the
 nature of international political order since the end of the Cold War, and
 more recently since the n September 2001 attacks, appear to have enabled
 such mid-sized powers as Turkey to play more influential and independent
 roles in their own regions. The Cold War-era practice of following the
 leadership of alternative power blocks seems to have ended first with the
 evaporation of bipolarity in the wake of the Soviet Union's demise and then
 with the emergence of new power centres and areas of strategic exploration
 over the last decade.
 The transition from the strict bipolarity to multipolarity also means that
 there has occurred a gradual decrease in the power capabilities of Turkey's
 traditional western partners. It now seems Turkey's western partners no
 longer possess the mixture of power of coercion and power of attraction that
 enabled them to maintain their unrivalled leadership in the past. Turkey's
 value in global politics has been positively affected by the rise of identity
 politics in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.
 Those who argue that the United States is now a global power in
 gradual decline underline that it might still be the predominant power
 on earth but is far from being omnipotent and omnipresent. America's
 primacy is increasingly questioned, even in military terms, as the American
 war machine appears to have bogged down in the quagmires of Iraq and
 Afghanistan, typical examples of asymmetric warfare.
 30 According to German Marshall Fund's 2010 transatlantic trends survey, the ratio of
 Turks who want to see Turkey act alone in international politics is around 40 percent.
 Six percent think that Turkey should side with the US and 13 percent think that Turkey
 should side with the EU.
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 To many observers, President Barack Obama has been trying to manage
 the US's decline in a peaceful and cost-effective manner, first by getting
 rid of the Wilsonian approach of former President George W. Bush and
 then developing functional and pragmatic cooperation with emerging and
 rising powers and traditional allies alike.'1 The argument is that rather than
 investing in long-term alliance relationships based on commonality of
 norms and values, the current US administration has now been employing
 an offshore balancing strategy, according to which forging interest-based
 strategic partnerships with pivotal countries in key regions is seen as critical
 to prevent the rise of potential challengers to American primacy.32 This
 article contends that the offshore balancing strategy, rather than the strategy
 of preponderance and domination, tends to make it much easier for such
 regional powers as Turkey to act in their neighbourhoods more freely.
 Turkey's ability to maneuver, in addition to the Turkey-centric approach,
 appears also to have been accelerated by Obama's approach to the Middle
 East. The new administration has not only set clear datelines for the
 withdrawal of American troops from Iraq and Afghanistan but also given
 the benefit of the doubt to regional initiatives to help bring Syria and Iran
 back into the international community.33 The president has also given up the
 strategy of forceful democratization from the top-down. Undoubtedly, the
 prospects of American withdrawal from these countries have not only led
 Turkish rulers to reflect upon the geopolitical environment that might arise
 following the US departure but also urged American leaders to improve
 relations with Turkey in the hope that it could play a stabilizing role in the
 post-withdrawal age.
 Moreover, current American foreign policy understanding appears to
 have affected the way in which the Turkish-American bilateral relationship
 has been unfolding in recent years. The gradual decline in America's global
 position as well as the increase in Turkey's power capabilities seem to have
 increased Turkey's bargaining power vis-à-vis the US. It has now become
 less costly for traditional U S allies to sometimes pursue independent foreign
 31 Pamela Celler, Robert Spencer, and John Bolton, The Post-American Presidency:
 The Obama Administration's War on America (New York: Threshold Editions, 2010).
 Its "reset" policy with Russia and engagement with the members of the axis of evil
 are examples of this approach. Relations with the key global actors of Russia, China,
 Brazil, India, and Japan appear to reflect this new understanding.
 32 Adam Quinn, "The art of declining politely: Obama's prudent presidency and the
 waning of American power," international Affairs 87, no. 4 (2010): 803-24.
 33 Ibid., 817-22.
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 policy courses. What makes Turkey's new foreign policy Turkey-centric is
 that unlike the Cold War era Turkey now feels the burden of entrapment
 more than the burden of abandonment. The strategic costs of following
 US leadership in the name of guaranteeing US commitment to Turkey's
 security appear to have now exceeded the expected payoffs. Turkish leaders
 increasingly ask how strategic cooperation with the United States might
 affect Turkey's relations with its neighbours and other centres of power.
 A similar situation can be observed in the EU's changing position in
 global power politics and the impact this appears to have had on Turkey's
 approach towards the EU. The idea of membership in the EU appears to
 have lost some of its legitimacy in Turkish eyes over the last years due to
 many factors, including, importantly, the gradual decline of the EU's global
 position. Even though the deepening and widening dimensions of the EU's
 integration process have strengthened since the onset of the post-Cold War
 era, this does not mean that a concomitant increase has occurred in the
 EU's global position. Despite the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty and
 the launching of successful European security and defence missions on
 the ground, the EU is still far from becoming a single-voice global actor in
 foreign, defence, and security policy realms.
 Its power of attraction—the normative foundations of the EU project—
 has also come under strong criticism from many directions. For example,
 the recent economic crisis has put the EU project under serious risk as it has
 revealed that member-states tend to put their national interests above the
 so-called common European interests. The European Union has in recent
 years turned inwards and adopted a low-profile stance abroad, which does
 not augur well for Turkey's eventual accession.
 How the European Union has thus far responded to Turkey's
 membership aspirations has also profoundly shaped Turkey's perception
 of the EU. Accession negotiations with Turkey got off the ground in 2005,
 yet the pace of negotiations has been slow and opposition to Turkey's
 prospective membership has increased dramatically. The slowing of
 Turkey's Europeanization process in recent years could be equally attributed
 to Turkey's political and constitutional crises, but one should certainly
 take internal EU developments into account—and in particular growing
 enlargement fatigue—to fully grasp Turkey's resentment towards the EU.34
 34 Omer Tampinar, "A complacent west could easily face the previously unthinkable
 question: 'Who lost Turkey?' Turkey's fading dream of Europe," Current History, March
 2007, 123-29.
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 In the meanwhile, the ideas of privileged or differentiated membership
 have become more pronounced in recent years. While the first denotes the
 qualitative improvement of relations between EU and Turkey, mainly on
 strategic and foreign policy issues and short of Turkey's full membership,
 the latter stands for conditional Turkish membership in that the idea is that
 Turkey would join the EU as a member but continue to remain outside of
 some policy realms.35 The point worth underlining in this context is that
 the more the credentials of Turkey's EU membership have been challenged
 by the Europeans, the more Turkish rulers and society alike have adopted a
 Turkey-centric view in response. A clear example is that Turkish rulers have
 now coined a new concept to demonstrate their uneasiness with the EU's
 lack of political resolve to admit Turkey as a member—the Ankara criteria.
 The content of the Ankara criteria bears a strong resemblance to the EU's
 Copenhagen criteria.36 Turkish rulers continue to stress that Turkey needs to
 transform alongside the liberal-democratic norms of the European Union,
 yet they simultaneously underline that Turkey should be in the driver's seat of
 this transformation and should adjust the pace and intensity of such reforms
 according to its ability to digest them. The concept of the Ankara criteria
 implicitly suggests that what matters more is Turkey's transformation into a
 liberal-democratic polity rather than eventual membership in the EU.
 Another factor feeding the Turkey-centric approach and boosting
 Turkey's ability to maneuver in its region is that Russia has been recovering
 from its strategic retrenchment of the early post-Cold war years while China
 is asserting itself as the next global hegemón. Many Turks now believe that
 forging closer strategic cooperation with these countries would not only help
 Turkey offset its deteriorating relations with the western actors but also have
 a say in a future post-western world. Some even argue that Turkey has more
 in common with China and Russia because all three appear to believe that
 national sovereignty and territorial integrity should remain the most sacred
 principles of international politics and involvement in other states' internal
 affairs should be kept to a minimum and subjected to serious limitations.37
 35 Heather Grabbe and Sinan Ulgen, "The way forward for Turkey and the EU: A
 strategic dialogue on foreign policy," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
 December 2010.
 36 Omer Celik, vice-chairman of the Justice and Democracy party in charge of external
 affairs, suggested that Turkey rename the Copenhagen criteria the Ankara criteria and
 continue the reform process, Athens, 7 October 2010.
 37 John Feffer, "How Turkey is chasing China to become the next big thing," http://
 motherjones.com.
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 The adoption of the Turkey-centric westernism approach has also
 been informed by the structural changes taking place at the regional level,
 particularly in the Middle East, over the last decade. These changes are
 important insofar as they have contributed to Turkey's security sensitivities
 and vulnerabilities in a realpolitik sense, underlined the need to deal with
 such challenges with European and western foreign policy tools, and made it
 clear that Turkey's power of attraction in the Middle East would increasingly
 become dependent on its institutional links with western actors as well as
 the continuation of the liberal-democratization process at home.
 The first point to mention is that the Middle East has become more
 Hobbesian than Kantian in the wake of US-led regime change in Iraq. The
 US military intrusion into the area has increased the possibility of Iraq's
 dismemberment along communal-ethnical-sectarian lines; boosted Iran's
 regional influence and contributed to the rise of a Shiite crescent; galvanized
 regional politics; fuelled anti-western and anti-American feelings; worsened
 the prospects of a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute; and contributed
 to the polarization of regional politics along different axes, such as the
 "axis of moderation" versus the "axis of evil."'8 Such developments point
 to the importance of Turkey's minimizing their negative consequence on
 its national security. Taking proactive and bolder initiatives has increasingly
 become a realpolitik necessity rather than an issue of choice. At stake has not
 only been the possibility of Turkey's being drawn into the quagmire but also
 how this might affect the prospects of its EU membership. The fear was that
 the more Turkey was seen to be part of the Hobbesian Middle East, the more
 difficult it would be to join the Kantian EU.
 Turkey has increasingly adopted European tools and instruments in its
 efforts to get rid of the negative consequences of the developments in the
 Middle East, making the Turkey-centric approach increasingly congruent
 with westernism. That the Arab countries have somehow lost their ability
 to help shape the regional developments in the post-Saddam era has also
 strengthened Turkey's agency in the Middle East. Since the regime change
 in Iraq, non-Arab countries have been on the rise in the region. Iran and
 Turkey appear to have gained the most from the emerging power vacuum in
 the post-Saddam Iraq.
 38 The "axis of moderation" is a term that denotes the US-oriented Sunni regimes in the
 Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan. These are mainly authoritarian
 regimes that also view the rise of Shiite influence in the Middle East through alarmed
 eyes. The "axis of evil" is the term that is coined by the Bush administration to denote
 the close cooperation among Iran, Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah.
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 CONCLUSION
 This study has argued that Turkey's approach towards the western actors
 has recently evolved into Turkey-centric westernism. Exogenous factors at
 the systemic and regional levels on the one hand, and Turkey's increasing
 power capabilities as well as the penetration of the strategic-depth doctrine
 into Turkey's body politic on the other, appear to have played the most
 decisive roles in this process. Systemic and regional factors have contributed
 to Turkey's capability to maneuver in its neighbourhood and have also led
 Ankara to scrutinize the foundations of Turkey's traditional relations with
 the western actors.
 Turkey's relationship with western actors has gradually transformed
 into one of pragmatic and strategic cooperation based on common interests
 from what it used to be—a strong alliance based on common enemies
 and values. Another conclusion is that despite the fact that Turkey's
 approach towards the west has changed in a more pragmatic and interest
 based fashion, Turkey's foreign policy understanding and practices have
 increasingly become more European and western than ever. Not only has
 Turkey's transformation alongside western and European norms continued
 unabated, but it has increasingly begun to act as a typical western or European
 country in its foreign policies, particularly in the Middle East. However, this
 is not to say that the Europeanization and westernization of Turkish foreign
 policy have been caused by Turkey's desire to prove its European/western
 identity. Instead, realpolitik concerns have played more decisive roles in this
 outcome.
 As long as acting European and western in foreign policy pays off, this
 will continue. This is also why it would be inaccurate to point to Turkey's
 increasing involvement in the Middle East and the concomitant adoption
 of Turkey-centric westernism as a sign of Turkey's estrangement from the
 west.
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